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Abstract To counter the negative effects of a product-harm
crisis, brands hope to capitalize on their equity, and often use
advertising as a communication device to regain customers’
lost trust. We study how consumer characteristics and
advertising influence consumers’ first-purchase decisions
for two affected brands of peanut butter following a severe
Australian product-harm crisis. Both pre-crisis loyalty and
familiarity are found to form an important buffer against the
product-harm crisis, although this resilience decreases over
time. Also heavy users tend to purchase the affected brands
sooner, unless their usage rate decreased significantly during
the crisis. Brand advertising was found to be effective for the
stronger brand, but not for the weaker brand.
Keywords Product-harm crises . Brand equity .
Advertising .Multiple-event hazard model
Introduction
Product-harm crises are prevalent in the marketplace.
Notable examples include traces of benzene in Perrier, the
negative publicity affecting Vioxx following a report
suggesting that its prolonged use would increase the chance
of heart attacks, and Bausch & Lomb’s Renu contact lens
cleaner increasing the risk of a fungal infection. In the food-
service industry, the Taco Bell chain has recently been
confronted with an E. coli outbreak linked to its lettuce, and
with pictures of a rat plague in one of its New York
subsidiaries.1 Such crises can be devastating to a company
and harmful for society. According to the U.S. Consumer
Product Safety Commission (2005), injuries, deaths, and
property damages related to crises cost over $700 billion
annually. Obviously, the financial losses for the firm
involved tend to be huge as well. Apart from the enormous
costs directly linked to a product recall, the out-of-stock
situation and negative publicity may cause substantial
revenue losses. Estimates for the direct costs of Perrier’s
1990 crisis, for example, are around $30 million (Berman
1999), while 1 year later sales had only reached 60% of
their pre-recall level (Hartley 1995). Likewise, the Snow
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2006121322 for, respectively, the Vioxx case, the Bausch & Lomb
recall, the Taco Bell rat-plague incident, and the E.coli outbreak.
Brand Milk food-poisoning scandal in Japan had a devas-
tating impact on the company’s bottom line: it incurred a
loss of 51.6 billion yen in fiscal 2001, compared to a net
profit of 3.3 billion yen in fiscal 1999 (Finkelstein 2005).
Due to the increasing complexity of products, more
stringent product-safety legislation, and more demanding
customers, product-harm crises tend to occur ever more
frequently (Dawar and Pillutla 2000).2
Previous research on product crises has often focused on
providing checklists, advising on the role of different
business functions during and after a product crisis (e.g.,
Berman 1999). Another research stream has concentrated on
estimating the effect of the crisis on aggregate performance
measures, such as stock prices (e.g., Davidson and Worrell
1992) and brand sales (e.g., van Heerde et al. 2007). While
this research provides valuable insights, it does not examine
individual differences in how consumers react to the crisis.
Individual differences have been looked at in lab
experiments examining the impact of hypothetical brand
crises on brand evaluations and purchase intentions. In
these studies, the impact of negative news is found to be
moderated by certain consumer characteristics, such as
commitment to the brand (Ahluwalia et al. 2000), perceived
severity of the crisis (Laufer et al. 2005), and brand
familiarity (Ahluwalia 2002). As this research is mainly
experimental in nature, a number of external-validity issues
can be raised.3 First, the experimental setting might attract
artificial attention to the crisis, and create a demand bias
when subjects attempt to speculate on the purpose of the
experiment (Shimp et al. 1991). Furthermore, reported
intentions and behavior are known to not always coincide.
In addition, these studies offer limited insight into the
moderating effect of marketing decision variables such as
advertising, an instrument companies often use to restore
their brands’ tarnished image. Finally, marketplace dynam-
ics, such as spontaneous information sharing among
consumers and competitive activity, are typically not
accounted for (Dawar and Pillutla 2000).
In this study, we use scanner data from a natural
experiment, and shed light on the impact of own and
competitive advertising, while accounting for individual-
level differences in how consumers react to the crisis. We
hereby respond to Winer’s (1999) call for more scanner
studies supporting results found in lab studies to enhance the
latter’s external validity. Indeed, this method triangulation
provides greater confidence in the robustness of lab results if
they are proven to also hold in “less clean” real-life settings.
Specifically, we use real-life household-scanner data that
record consumer purchases, before, during and after a well-
publicized product-harm crisis. In June 1996, Kraft Foods,
Australia’s largest peanut-butter manufacturer, recalled its
two peanut-butter products, Eta and Kraft, because they
were linked to more than 100 cases of salmonella poisoning
(Sydney Morning Herald 1996a). The bacterial infection
was traced to a batch of contaminated peanuts, supplied to
the group by an outside manufacturer. Kraft Foods
Australia was engulfed in the worst crisis in its 70-year
history, and remained off the shelves for almost 5 months
during which the market shares of Eta and Kraft dropped
from, respectively, 13 and 42% to zero. In the meantime, its
main competitor Sanitarium took advantage of the crisis
situation by stressing in several advertising campaigns that it
had been roasting its own peanuts. Sanitarium’s market share
increased from 15 to 70% during the crisis period. Despite this
spectacular performance boost for Sanitarium, overall demand
for peanut-butter products was down by 30% (Sydney
Morning Herald 1996a, b). This crisis was also investigated
in a recent study by van Heerde et al. (2007). However, their
use of aggregate performance measures precluded the
detection of any individual-level differences.
Within this setting, we focus on the first-purchase
decision after the product-harm crisis, as it is typically
associated with higher risk in the diffusion literature.
Especially in case of a product-harm crisis, buying an
affected brand is perceived as highly risky (Pennings et al.
2002), making the trial purchase a first hurdle to be taken in
order to regain a consumer’s trust. We study the effect of
various consumer characteristics on the timing of the trial
purchase of the affected brands after the crisis. In addition,
we focus on the effectiveness of Kraft Foods’ post-crisis
advertising campaign, as well as the impact of advertising
expenditures by non-affected competitors.
Conceptual framework
Product-harm crises can seriously hurt a firm’s performance.
During the prolonged out-of-stock situation often associated
with the product recall, customers may switch to competing
brands, or even decide to quit buying the category.
Moreover, the company is likely to face a damaged image
and a substantial drop in consumer trust (Dawar and Pillutla
2000). Apart from the apparent impact on the affected
brands/companies, a product-harm crisis may also corrode
trust in the product category as a whole, as the inadequacy
of the production process can be perceived to be an
industry-wide problem (De Alessi and Staaf 1994).
2 The U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (2005), for
example, completed 397 cooperative recalls in 2005, involving 67
million product units, compared to only 221 recalls affecting eight
million product units in 1988 (Berman 1999). Of course, also the
administration in power can impact the number of recalls.
3 In another attempt to increase the external validity of experimental
findings, Dawar and Pillutla (2000) used survey data on the awareness
and the impact on brand equity of an ongoing real-life product-harm
crisis.
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The bad publicity surrounding the crisis tends to be
weighed heavily when making product judgments—a
phenomenon referred to as negativity bias—as it is perceived
both as diagnostic and surprising (Herr et al. 1991). In
addition, negative news is reported more frequently and
more vividly, as it is against the norm (Weinberger and
Lepkowska-White 2000), and considered more credible than
positive news spread by the company itself (Ahluwalia et al.
2000). However, negativity effects can be moderated by
several consumer characteristics. In addition, advertising
may be used to counter the negative news, and be
instrumental to re-establish trust in the category and brand.
Pre-crisis brand loyalty Loyal consumers are more likely to
engage in biased processing (Ahluwalia et al. 2000). They
tend to resist or discount information that is disconfirmatory
or counterattitudinal, and to counter-argue negative news
about their preferred brands more often to minimize cognitive
dissonance (Dawar and Pillutla 2000). As a consequence,
loyal consumers have been found to show more sympathy for
the brand, and believe the company deserves their help
(Stockmeyer 1996). Loyal customers have also been found to
be less likely to switch brands during out-of-stock situations:
because of their limited experience with competing items,
their search costs tend to be higher. They also incur higher
substitution costs when buying non-preferred items (Campo
et al. 2000). We therefore expect a positive impact of
consumers’ pre-crisis loyalty on their post-crisis trial rate.
Interaction between pre-crisis brand loyalty and time The
presence of a loyal customer base is a key indicator of
brand equity (Aaker 1996, p. 319), which may offer
resilience in the face of misfortune (Hoeffler and Keller
2003). Because of the product recall, people no longer have
the opportunity to increase their personal experience with
the affected brand, while companies are not inclined to
advertise a product that is not available (van Heerde et al.
2007). As personal experience and advertising are instru-
mental in maintaining brand equity (Aaker and Biel 1993),
the protection offered by the pre-crisis loyalty of the
customer base is expected to erode over time.
Pre-crisis brand familiarity People exposed to new infor-
mation on a familiar brand perceive positive news to be as
diagnostic as negative information, as opposed to unfamil-
iar customers who tend to weigh negative news more
heavily (Ahluwalia 2002). Jolly and Mowen (1985) found
that news of a product recall influenced evaluations of a
company more negatively when the company was un-
known. Furthermore, familiarity increases a consumer’s
confidence toward the brand (Laroche et al. 1996), and
familiar brands are often perceived to be less responsible
for a crisis (Mowen 1980). As such, we expect a higher
repurchase rate after the crisis for customers familiar with
the affected products.4 However, pre-crisis brand familiarity
could also be a liability. Brands familiar to a large fraction
of the population are likely to receive more scrutiny from
the media than less familiar ones (Rhee and Haunschild
2006), making their crisis more salient to more customers.
Pre-crisis category usage Heavy users are likely to be more
appreciative of the benefits of the product (Lim et al. 2005),
making them less likely to fully defect from the category.
Given their extensive experience with the category, they are
also in a better position to make product judgments, and are
expected to have lower perceived risks (Goering 1985). We
therefore expect a positive impact of pre-crisis category
usage on post-crisis trial rates.
Change in category usage As indicated earlier, a product-
harm crisis may influence consumption in the category as a
whole (De Alessi and Staaf 1994). Consumers who do not
reduce category consumption, however, seem to have
sustained trust in the category. It should be easier to convince
them to try the affected products once they become available
again. Indeed, a first hurdle (i.e., buying in the category) has
already been taken. On the other hand, as category consump-
tion during the crisis can only occur through the purchase of
competing (non-affected) brands, these customers’ familiarity
and behavioral loyalty will increasingly shift towards those
brands, making it harder to convince them to switch back to
the affected products. Because of these countervailing forces,
we do not advance a directional hypothesis.
Cross and competitive purchases Apart from consumption
during the crisis, also the usage of the category after the
crisis is important. We distinguish between after-crisis
consumption of the non-affected brands (labeled as com-
petitive purchases) and of the other affected brand (referred
to as cross purchases). If consumers buy another brand after
the crisis, the resulting purchase-feedback effects (Goldfarb
2006) may adversely impact the likelihood of trial of the
affected brand under investigation. On the other hand, it
may also be argued that consumers purchasing other brands
after the crisis have not lost trust in the category as a whole,
and by consequence are easier to convince to repurchase
the affected brands. Again, no directional hypothesis is
given because of the two aforementioned opposing forces.
Own advertising The size of advertising effects tends to be
fairly small for established brands (Lodish et al. 1995). One
would expect the effectiveness of post-crisis investments to
4 We do not consider an interaction effect with time, as our
operationalization of pre-crisis brand familiarity already accounts for
a decreasing impact with time.
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be even smaller, as the crisis may have damaged the brand’s
reputation. On the other hand, it has been argued that the
heightened brand awareness and media attention during a
crisis period could actually result in a higher return on
advertising investments than if they were part of routine
equity-building activities (Dawar 1998).
Cross and competitive advertising Apart from own adver-
tising, two kinds of “competing” advertising may have an
impact: by other affected brands (which we label as cross
advertising) and by non-affected competitors (referred to as
competitive advertising). Their impact on the trial rate of an
affected brand may be two-fold. On the one hand, this
advertising could primarily serve an informational role,
trying to resolve some of the uncertainty and risks
associated with buying any product in the affected category
(Byzalov and Shachar 2004). Because of the resulting
primary-demand effect, also the trial rate of directly
affected products could be influenced positively. On the
other hand, cross and competitive advertising can primarily
have a persuasive role, emphasizing the differential advan-
tages of the specific brand being advertised, thereby
delaying the purchase of all other brands. It remains an
empirical question to establish which effect prevails.
Model
We focus on when consumers start to purchase the affected
brands again after a product crisis.Hazardmodels are often used
to study timing decisions because of two key advantages. First,
they can easily accommodate that the actual purchase timing is
unknown for households who have not yet bought the brand
before the end of the observation period (referred to as censored
observations). If the numberof censoredhouseholdswere small,
onemight consider excluding them from the analysis. However,
80% (51) of the households in our sample did not yet purchase
Eta (Kraft) by the end of the observation period. Omitting them
from the sample would involve a considerable loss of
information, and may result in biased parameter estimates.
Alternatively, one could consider assigning each of these
observations the observed length until the endof the observation
period. However, this would underestimate these households’
true timing, and again result in a substantial bias (Allison 1984).
Second, when relating a timing decision to covariates,
one often encounters the difficulty that this timing depends
on the entire time path of values for these covariates, rather
than on a single value. For example, the trial decision may
depend on whether and when competing products were
bought in the preceding weeks. Unlike conventional
regression analyses, hazard models are well suited to deal
both with censored observations and with time-varying
covariates (see Allison 1984 for an in-depth discussion).
Following earlier studies in marketing (e.g. Mitra and
Golder 2002), we specify a semi-parametric proportional
hazard model (Cox 1972) for Eta:
λEta;i tð Þ¼λ0;Eta tð Þ exp βEtaXEta;i tð Þ
 
exp αEtaZEta;i tð Þ tþtcð Þ
 
ð1Þ
l0;Eta tð Þ is the baseline hazard, which corresponds to the trial
rate of the base group, i.e. households for which all covariates
are zero, and XEta;i tð Þ is a vector of covariates (including pre-
crisis brand loyalty, pre-crisis familiarity and category usage,
change in category usage, own advertising, cross advertising,
competitive advertising, cross purchases and competitive
purchases) for consumer i that cause an up- or downward
adjustment in that baseline. In the final term, we interact the
covariates in the ZEta;i tð Þ vector with the time elapsed since
the start of the crisis (t+tc) to capture the covariates for which
the effect is allowed to gradually increase/decrease over time.5
In our model ZEta;i tð Þ consists of pre-crisis brand loyalty.
A similar hazard model is specified for Kraft. We refer to
the Appendix for a discussion on the partial likelihood
method used to estimate the parameters from this multiple-
event hazard model.
Data
Household scanner data describing the peanut-butter pur-
chases of 615 households in two major Australian cities
(Melbourne and Sydney) were obtained from ACNielsen
Australia. The data covered 5 years (1996-2000). These were
split in two initialization periods and one estimation period.
The former cover the period from 01/01/1996 to 06/26/1996
(the date the brands were recalled), and from 06/27/1996 until
11/24/1996 (the moment the brands were available again).
We use them to quantify consumer purchase characteristics
before and during the crisis, respectively. The estimation
period goes from 11/25/1996 to 12/31/2000. All households
made at least one peanut-butter purchase in the pre-crisis
period, and are observed throughout both initialization
periods. One hundred twenty-three (20%) made a post-
crisis purchase of Eta, while 299 (49%) bought Kraft again.6
The median (completed) time to repurchase Eta after the
crisis is 341 days, as opposed to only 196 days for
6 This sample size is in line with earlier applications of hazard-rate
models in the marketing literature (see e.g. Gielens and Dekimpe
2007, Helsen and Schmittlein 1993 or Mitra and Golder 2002). Also
the number of completed observations (both in absolute and relative
terms) is comparable to the number observed in earlier studies.
Moreover, even if one would make complete abstraction of the
information content contained in the censored observations, our
parameter to observation ratio would still exceed considerably the
1:5 ratio advocated in Leeflang et al. (2000).
5 This time component consists of the length of the recall period (tc)
and the time elapsed since the product is available again (t).
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Kraft. Weekly advertising spending (in AU$) by the major
brands was also provided by AC Nielsen Australia.
We now turn to the operationalization of the explanatory
variables. Given that we use scanner data, our measures are
behavioral rather than attitudinal. Similarly, we focus on
purchase history instead of consumption history (see
Bucklin et al. 1998 for a similar practice). Table 1 shows
key descriptive statistics. In line with Bucklin et al. (1998),
we specify pre-crisis loyalty to an affected brand as its
within-household market share before the crisis (Pre-crisis
brand loyalty). As argued by Aaker (1996, p. 332), pre-
crisis market share offers a good summary measure of the
brand’s equity before the crisis. We operationalize pre-crisis
brand familiarity as the number of days since the last
purchase before the start of the crisis (Pre-crisis brand
familiarity).7 In contrast to a simpler 0/1 operationalization,
this measure takes into account the decreasing impact over
time of a previous purchase experience with the brand
(Mehta et al. 2004). Familiarity is closely linked with brand
awareness, another pillar of brand equity (Aaker 1991, p. 19,
64). As in Bucklin et al. (1998), we measure category usage
as the average daily purchase quantity. We consider both
average category consumption before the crisis (Pre-crisis
category usage), and the difference (in percentage terms)
between average category usage during and before the crisis
(Change in category usage). Cross and Competitive Pur-
chases are specified as two weekly time-varying variables
measuring the total volume purchased by the household of,
respectively, the other affected brand and the non-affected
competitors since the end of the crisis. With regard to
advertising, we include three weekly time-varying covariates
measuring advertising of, respectively, the affected brand (Own
Advertising), the other affected brand (Cross Advertising), and
the non-affected competitors (Competitive Advertising). To
also capture potential carry-over effects of advertising, we
estimate the stock of advertising effort available to the brand
as an exponentially weighted average of current and past
advertising expenditures, for which the decay parameter is
determined through a grid search (see Tellis and Weiss 1995
7 Households that did not purchase the affected brand before the crisis
were given the maximum value for pre-crisis familiarity (178 days). In
unreported analyses, we increased this upper value by 10%. Our
substantive results were not affected.
Table 1 Descriptive statistics for explanatory variables
Variable Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Pre-crisis brand loyalty
Eta 13 31 0 100
Kraft 42 46 0 100
Pre-crisis brand familiarity
Eta 159 45 3 178
Kraft 119 67 1 178
Category usage
Pre-crisis category usage (in grams per day) 6.83 6.58 1.12 56.88
Change in category usage (in percentage) −15% 108% −100% 1,130%
Cross purchases (in 100 g)
Eta 9.57 23.04 0.00 252.50
Kraft 1.63 6.24 0.00 93.60
Competitive purchases (in 100 g)
Eta 17.42 49.73 0.00 798.75
Kraft 21.83 52.26 0.00 667.5
Advertising (1,000,000 AU $)a
Eta advertising 1.95 3.20 0.00 13.73
Kraft advertising 11.58 8.11 0.42 46.17
Competitive advertising 2.46 5.93 0.00 35.26
Areab 52%
Household size 3.43 1.46 1.00 8.00
Inventory (in 100 g)
Eta 3.27 2.30 0.00 27.50
Kraft 2.85 2.40 0.00 26.25
a To illustrate the variation over the analyzed 214-week period of the time-varying advertising measures, we report the mean and standard
deviation of the adstock variables over the estimation period.
b Dummy variable indicating whether the household lives in Sydney (value 1) or Melbourne (value 0). We report the proportion of households
having the value 1.
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for a similar practice).8 As control variables, we also add the
area of residence (Melbourne or Sydney), the household size,
as well as the volume purchased in the category on the
previous purchase occasion. The latter variable controls for
potential inventory effects.
Results
Table 2 shows the parameter estimates for the model
outlined before. Pre-crisis loyalty has a significant (p<
0.01) positive impact on trial for both Eta and Kraft. This
supports earlier experimental findings that loyal customers
are less sensitive to negative news (Ahluwalia et al. 2000),
and is in line with Campo et al. (2000) that loyal customers
switch less in an out-of-stock situation due to higher
substitution and search costs. This protection is found to
gradually erode, however, as indicated by the negative
interaction between loyalty and time (p<0.01). The
parameter estimates for pre-crisis brand familiarity are
significantly negative (p<0.01 and p<0.05 for Eta and
Kraft, respectively).9 This finding confirms that product
experience can trigger defensive strategies against negative
information on the brand (Ahluwalia et al. 2001), although
this applies mostly for recent purchases because of
forgetting (Mehta et al. 2004). The effect of pre-crisis
category usage on the probability of trial is significantly
positive (p<0.05) for both Eta and Kraft. Heavy users are
less inclined to cancel their purchases, as they are more
familiar with the benefits of the product (Lim et al. 2005),
and have lower perceived risks than light or medium users
(Goering 1985). Apart from the category usage before the
crisis, also the change in category usage during the crisis is
important. A reduction is indicative of the extent to which
trust in the category as a whole is lost. A positive effect
(causing a delayed trial if the usage rate is reduced) is
obtained for both brands, even though statistical signifi-
cance is only obtained for Kraft (p<0.05).10 In terms of the
cross-purchase effects, an interesting asymmetry is ob-
served. While a purchase for the stronger brand (Kraft)
delays (p<0.05) the subsequent trial of the smaller brand
(Eta), no such effect is observed when Eta was first
purchased. Strong brands are known to impact competitors
extensively, while their vulnerability is typically low
(Kamakura and Russell 1989). Competitive purchases did
8 The adstock variables are measured as ADSTOCKt ¼ αADVtþ
1 αð ÞADSTOCKt1, where ADVt is the advertising expenditure in
week t. α reflects the decay in advertising effectiveness. We allow for
different decay parameters for advertising expenditures by the three
brands (Eta, Kraft and non-affected competitors). The optimal values,
obtained through a grid search, ranged from 0.1 (Eta) to 0.2 (non-
affected competitors). The initialization period for the adstock
variables corresponds to the period before the reintroduction of the
affected brands (11 months).
9 Since the degree of pre-crisis familiarity decreases with the number
of days since the last purchase before the crisis, a negative sign
indicates that less familiarity delays trial.
10 In unreported analyses, we also tested for an interaction effect
between this category-change effect and the perceived substitutability
between the brands in the category. The latter was proxied by a
dummy indicating whether or not that consumer was a switcher before
the crisis. Following Lim et al. (2005), this dummy takes the value of
one if each brand’s pre-crisis loyalty is less than or equal to 50%. The
interaction effect was significant and positive (p<0.1) for both brands,
while the main effect for Kraft remained. This indicates that the trust
issue is important in general, but even more so for households with a
high perceived substitutability of the brands in the category. We thank
an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.
Table 2 Empirical results
Hypothesized effect Eta Kraft
Pre-crisis brand loyalty + 0.015c (0.005) 0.017c (0.004)
Interaction between pre-crisis brand loyalty and time – −1.7e−05c (7.6e−06) −1.8e−05c (7.5e−06)
Pre-crisis brand familiarity +/− −0.007c (0.002) −0.003b (0.001)
Pre-crisis category usage + 0.022b (0.012) 0.027b (0.014)
Change in category usage +/− 0.050 (0.108) 0.107b (0.052)
Cross purchases +/− −0.018b (0.008) 0.011 (0.012)
Competitive purchases +/− −0.001 (0.002) −0.003 (0.005)
Own advertising + −0.261 (0.178) 0.107b (0.055)
Cross advertising +/− 0.009 (0.088) 0.164 (0.129)
Competitive advertising +/− −0.090a (0.051) −0.063b (0.028)
Control variables
Area +/− 0.239 (0.470) −0.210 (0.349)
Household size + 0.099a (0.066) 0.078b (0.044)
Inventory − 0.013 (0.039) −0.090c (0.032)
Robust standard errors between brackets. a , b and c indicate a significant result at, respectively, the 10, 5 and 1% significance level. Reported
significance tests are one-sided in case a directional hypothesis is specified, and two-sided otherwise.
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not (p>0.10) delay the purchase of either brand. As such,
the two opposing forces (i.e. a negative feedback and a
positive trust effect) seem to result in a non-significant net
effect. While own advertising has a significant positive
effect on the trial probability of Kraft (p<0.05), advertising
expenditures for Eta are not effective in stimulating Eta’s
post-crisis trial rate (p>0.10). Using aggregate analyses,
and focusing on the total sales impact rather than trial, van
Heerde et al. (2007) also obtained a non-significant own
advertising effect for Eta, and a positive post-crisis
advertising effectiveness for Kraft. Not surprisingly, as
cross-effects tend to be smaller than own effects, Eta was
not helped by Kraft’s advertising either, while it also did
not have enough clout to create a positive spill-over to
Kraft. With regard to competitive advertising from non-
affected competitors, we find a negative effect for both
Kraft (p<0.05) and Eta (p<0.10). This implies that
competitors probably used their advertising more to
persuade consumers to purchase the advertised brands than
to re-establish trust in the category. In unreported analyses,
we checked for interaction effects between these advertising
variables and the aforementioned individual-level character-
istics. No such evidence was found.
Finally, two of the control variables turned out to be
significant. Inventory has the expected negative sign for
Kraft, while the parameter estimate for household size is
significantly positive for both brands, supporting the idea that
larger households purchase more frequently. The place of
residence had no significant effect on the trial probabilities.
Discussion
To overcome negative crisis effects, companies hope that
their brand equity will help them weather the storm, and
tend to resort to advertising communications to rebuild their
tarnished image. Our research, though limited to one case
study, allows us to contrast along both dimensions the
performance of a ‘strong’ (Kraft) and ‘weaker’ (Eta) brand
owned by the same company (Kraft Foods). Both brands
were recalled for 5 months, during which their market
shares dropped from 13 (Eta) and 42% (Kraft) to zero.
While Kraft was able to reach 70% of its pre-crisis sales
level within one quarter of its reintroduction, Eta had a
much harder time to recover, with less than half of its pre-
crisis sales level recovered after one quarter. Our findings
help put these differences in perspective.
First, we found that pre-crisis equity indeed provides an
important protection against product-harm crises. Even
after an out-of-stock situation of five months, both loyal
and more familiar consumers (i.e. who bought the brand
more recently) showed a significantly higher trial probabil-
ity once the product was back on the shelves. Even though
the parameter estimates were comparable for both brands,
Kraft’s pre-crisis loyalty (42% on average, see Table 1) and
familiarity (119 days) were considerably higher than for Eta
(13% and 159 days), giving the former more resilience
against the crisis. If Kraft’s pre-crisis loyalty had been only
half as large (i.e. 21% rather than 42%), its initial trial rate
following its relaunch would have been 25% lower.
Moreover, strong brands have been found to be less
vulnerable and to have more clout. We find that these
effects also apply to product crises: households who bought
Kraft became less likely to also buy Eta, while the reverse
did not hold. Hence, apart from the well-documented
benefits (e.g., Aaker 1991) that accrue to the brand in
prosperous times (such as an increased effectiveness of
marketing programs, the possibility of premium pricing,
and a higher success rate for brand extensions), we identify
the creation of a buffer against negative events as another
important reason to invest in brand equity. While this
function has been mentioned in the brand-equity literature
(e.g., Hoeffler and Keller 2003), our results offer empirical
validation in a non-laboratory setting.
However, this protection does not extend indefinitely. During
the recall period, consumers cannot nurture their relationship
with the brand through personal experiences, while companies
are not inclined to advertise a brand that is not available. As a
consequence, the loyalty effect tends to decrease over time. This
decrease is not negligible: after the 5-month recall period,
already more than 15% of the initial loyalty protection was lost
for both brands. In order to avoid this erosion, one should try to
keep the recall period as short as possible, and perhaps
announce well ahead of time the products’ renewed availability.
Also the intensity of category usage was found to be an
important moderator. Usage increases the experience with
the category and decreases the perceived risks of using the
product. However, not only pre-crisis category usage
matters. A crisis can impact other—not directly affected—
brands, as the inadequacy of the production process may be
perceived to be an industry-wide problem. Consumers who
cancel all (or most) of their purchases during the recall
period have lost trust in the category, and have switched to
other categories. Bringing them back is hard, and may take a
prolonged effort from all industry participants.
Finally, companies often resort to advertising to restore
trust in their affected brands (Hale et al. 2005). Brand
advertising for Kraft turned out to be effective in con-
vincing consumers to return to the brand; however, Eta’s
advertising was not. Eta’s management may have realized
this, which may explain why so little was spent on Eta in
the months following the crisis (as also observed in van
Heerde et al. 2007). Even though more research is needed
across other brands and product crises to replicate this
observation, it suggests an additional benefit of having a
strong equity: not only does it offer a direct buffer against
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product crises, it also increases the effectiveness of post-
recall communication efforts. In combination with the
considerable effort spent on advertising Kraft (as it was
clearly out-spending its rivals, see Table 1), this may
explain further Kraft’s quick recovery.
Different avenues for future research can be formulated.
First, one could examine whether a crisis also affects other
components of purchase behavior such as quantity and
category-consumption decisions. Rather than just focusing
on the trial decision, one could also consider the subsequent
purchases. Furthermore, we focused on the extent of
advertising expenditure, while it may be important to also
look at the content of the advertisements. Similarly, all our
measures were behavioral. Even though loyalty has been
called “a core dimension of brand equity ... of sufficient
relevance to use as a criterion variable” (Aaker 1996, p.
319), other, more attitudinal measures of the brand equity
construct would be useful to consider as well. Finally, we
focused on one product-harm crisis. It would be useful to
replicate our analysis to other crises. An obvious candidate
(given that it also involves a salmonella poisoning linked to
the consumption of peanut butter) is the recent US crisis
affecting ConAgra’s Peter Pan and Great Value brands
(Longpre and Nolan 2007). However, to increase the
variability in industry, crisis characteristics, and recovery
strategy, it would be useful to also apply our approach to
product crises in other categories/industries. Not only
would such studies enable empirical generalizations, they
could also give insight into the moderating impact of
competitive response strategies (Dawar and Pillutla 2000),
and provide more insights on the appropriate courses of
action for brands of different strength.
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Appendix A
Estimation of the semi-parametric hazard model specified in
Eq. 1 is done by maximizing the partial likelihood, which can
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with N the total number of households included. The dummy
variable dEta,i indicates whether the observation for consumer
i is completed (dEta,i=1) or not (dEta,i=0). It excludes from
the numerator all right-censored households, i.e. those who
did not purchase Eta during the observation period. For
households who made a purchase at a specific time ti, one
considers the likelihood that the purchase was made by
household i rather than by any of the other households still
“at risk” (i.e. who have not yet purchased the product at an
earlier point in time). To determine the relevant risk set, a set
of indicator variables rEta,ij is created, with rEta,ij=1 if
household j has not yet bought Eta before ti, and zero
otherwise. Even though right-censored observations are
excluded from the numerator in Eq. 2, they appear in the
risk-set composition of the denominator. Note that the
baseline hazard cancels out from the partial likelihood
function. As a result, no distributional specification for the
baseline hazard is needed.
As two brands, Eta and Kraft, were affected by the
product-harm crisis under consideration, we extend the
single-event model specified in Eq. 2 to a multiple-failure
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At any point in time, the risk set for a specific event (i.e.
buying, respectively, Eta or Kraft) consists of those house-
holds who have not yet bought that brand. The risk-set
composition is thus brand specific, which corresponds to a
stratified proportional Cox model. Moreover, we allow for
different covariate effects for the two considered events.
The potential dependence between a particular house-
hold’s two purchase decisions is accounted for in two ways.
First, both the post-crisis volume purchased of Kraft (Eta)
and the advertising support given to Kraft (Eta) are included
in a time-varying way in XEta(t) (XKraft(t)). To control for any
unobserved correlation between the two hazard rates left, the
robust, “clustered” approach advocated in Lin (1994) is
adopted to estimate the variance-covariance matrix. This
approach accounts for the within-household (i.e. within-
cluster) correlation in the two timing decisions, while still
assuming independence across households (clusters).
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